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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, I examine the Chinese government’s treatment of foreigners within its 
borders, contrasting the high-profile case of British national Akmal Shaikh with the on-the-
ground situation, where foreigners generally receive lenient treatment from the police. I argue 
that this dichotomy parallels the Mainland government’s position towards Taiwan and Hong 
Kong, where de jure sovereignty is prioritized over de facto control. In explaining how some 
foreign criminals like Shaikh are moved from the periphery to the center of the government’s 
attention, I highlight the potential that such cases provide the Communist Party of China’s 
leadership to assert their power on the global stage and to cement their legitimacy in the eyes of 
their own populace. Building on work done by Tim Liao and others on China’s rhetorical 
strategies in issues of contested sovereignty, I will show how the Chinese media uses its 
portrayal of select foreign criminals as political symbols to fuel the government’s “memory 
project” regarding China’s relationship with Western countries. By examining how this 
constructed national memory is related to contemporary issues of crime and diplomacy, we can 
better understand how Chinese leadership understands and performs sovereignty. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The issue of state sovereignty is central to understanding contemporary China. 
Discussions on this topic tend to center around the PRC’s unusual relationship with Taiwan and 
Hong Kong, and while claims over territory are indeed an important aspect to Chinese 
sovereignty, much can also be learned through observing the government’s performances of 
sovereignty within the Mainland itself. My work explores the Chinese government’s treatment of 
foreign individuals charged with crimes in an attempt to illuminate Chinese claims and practices 
of sovereignty. I argue that how the central government punishes or tolerates police to show 
leniency to Western foreigners for their crimes can be understood as a reflection of the Chinese 
leadership’s unique understandings of their own sovereignty, and as a performance for the 
domestic and international audiences of those sovereignty claims. I explore this argument 
through the lens of one particular case- that of Akmal Shaikh, a Pakistani-born British citizen 
who in 2009 became the first European national executed in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) in over fifty years. I show how we can read this case, and others involving foreign 
nationals in China, as a performance of sovereignty staged by the Chinese government for the 
audiences of other countries and the Chinese public. This reading, I argue, affords valuable new 
insight in regards to how the PRC’s leaders perceive of their own sovereignty. Specifically, they 
claim complete de jure authority over foreigners1 who commit crimes inside China’s borders, 
even though a lack of complete de facto control on the ground is tolerated. This is significant in a 
number of ways. Historically, foreign nations (mostly European) denied this power to both the 
                                                          
1 In this work, I use the word “foreigners” to broadly mean people from Europe, North America, and Australia who 
are in China. When considering contemporary issues of extraterritoriality, I am excluding individuals protected by 
diplomatic, military, or other forms of internationally-recognized immunity. 
 - 2 - 
 
Qing and Republican governments that preceded the PRC. Juxtaposed to this historical memory, 
then, the contemporary performance of strong sovereignty provides crucial support to the 
Communist Party of China’s (CPC) legitimacy claims. Examining the legal treatment of Western 
foreigners charged with crimes in China reveals the existence of a unique Chinese version of 
sovereignty that puts greater emphasis on de jure authority than de facto control. This 
understanding of Chinese sovereignty is discussed by Sow Keat Tok in his book Managing 
Chinese Sovereignty in Hong Kong and Taiwan, in which he describes Chinese sovereignty as 
“graded rings of authorities forming round a nominal, sovereign core … embedded in a single, 
de jure sovereignty … [where] the de facto component- or right of governance- is disaggregated 
and distributed across the different levels according to each relative position” (Tok, 162). This 
unique way of seeing sovereignty, which does not fit cleanly with Western notions of the concept, 
can be observed not only in territorial claims as Tok demonstrates, but also in the government’s 
treatment of foreign individuals. The parallels between this area of bureaucracy and the 
Mainland’s relationship with Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, I argue, suggest that sovereignty 
itself may be understood and practiced differently in China than elsewhere. I further posit that in 
making sovereignty claims over foreigners and performing this power for international and 
domestic audiences, the Communist Party of China (CPC) leadership is constructing a historical 
memory, one that it is continually creating and propagating in an effort to bolster their own 
legitimacy. The selective use of foreign individuals as material in building this “memory project” 
bolsters the CPC’s claim that it is capable of defending the country from foreign exploitation.  
The international controversy that surrounded Akmal Shaikh, the first European citizen 
executed in China since 1951, saw a confluence of historical memories and modern politics. I 
will provide a brief summary of the relevant history, that of the Opium War and 
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extraterritoriality. I argue that understanding the “century of humiliation” during which stronger 
states denied the governments of China full sovereignty is crucial to analyzing modern Chinese 
sovereignty and to understanding why foreigners in China are such significant figures today. I 
will then briefly discuss how modern Chinese sovereignty is unique from other historical and 
contemporary interpretations of the concept, grounding my research in Tok’s work on graded 
rings of sovereignty. I will show how the Chinese government’s varying degrees of severity 
towards foreign criminals further support his model of core and peripheral areas of control. 
Finally, I will explain the government’s usage of foreigners as material to build their memory 
project. The purpose of this project, I argue, is to increase China’s international status and to 
bolster the CPC’s legitimacy claims amongst their own people. By unpacking these 
interconnected issues, I aim to shed light on the unique complexities of contemporary Chinese 
understandings and practices of sovereignty. 
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Chapter 2 
Akmal Shaikh’s Story 
There is an unfortunate irony in the fact that the purported reason behind Akmal Shaikh’s 
2007 move to China was to record a song that he believed “would usher in world peace” 
(“Execution of Akmal Shaikh”). Not only was his singing career denied a chance to take off, he 
himself would become a flashpoint for heated debate between two global giants. Before his story 
came to an end in December of 2009, Britain and China clashed repeatedly over the handling of 
his case, a case which sparked major outrage and condemnation from the governments and 
people of both countries. Shaikh’s execution came and went without either country taking any 
actions beyond strongly worded critiques of the other, but it took the efforts of both governments 
to prioritize their mutually beneficial trade relationship (Landreth) to prevent the very real 
possibility of escalation. While the leaders of Britain and China moved on, this case marked a 
significant moment in modern China’s relationship with the Western world from which much 
can be learned about how the CPC leadership makes decisions and views the world. 
Before he was a symbol of international debate, Shaikh was a man with a troubled past 
who had experienced repeated financial failure and had also run afoul of the law multiple times. 
After migrating with his parents to the United Kingdom from Pakistan as a child, he lived for a 
time in the United States and England working as an estate agent and a taxi business owner. 
Despite temporary success with his company, ‘Teksi,’ he fell into bankruptcy for a time in the 
90s. He ultimately sold the business in 2004 after being convicted for sexual harassment against 
an employee- in their negative portrayals of Shaikh, Chinese media were prompt to inform 
readers of this fact, as well as the fact that he neither attended the tribunal hearings nor paid the 
wages and damages his employee was owed (Qiu). His marriage ended in divorce that year, with 
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Shaikh moving to Poland and marrying a Polish woman who had been his secretary in London. 
After increasingly erratic behavior this marriage too broke down, and Shaikh spent the last 
months of his life as a free man homeless in Poland, wanted by a Lublin court for failure to pay 
alimonies to his ex-wife and living off of handouts. It was during this time that Shaikh came up 
with the notion to become a singer (despite no prior experience or, according to those who 
helped him record a demo of his song “Come Little Rabbit,” any singing ability). In Poland, he 
met a man named Carlos who claimed to have contacts in the music business and convinced 
Shaikh to fly to Kyrgyzstan in pursuit of his dreams of becoming a singer. There he was met by 
Carlos’ contacts, including a man called Okole who said he owned a nightclub in China where 
Shaikh could perform. Together they traveled to Dushanbe, Tajikistan, and from there Shaikh 
believed they would continue on together to China. Before their scheduled flight to China’s 
western province of Xinjiang, Okole claimed that the plane no longer had enough seats for both 
of them, giving Shaikh a bag to take with him and saying that he’d come on the next flight. This 
is when, according to his defenders, the 51-year old Shaikh was unwittingly turned into a pawn 
for smugglers who had targeted him as a simpleton who could be used as a drug mule. Prior to 
the flight, these people had taken his passport and money (returning the passport before his 
flight), and despite the suspiciousness of this act and the request to carry Okole’s bag, Shaikh 
nonetheless took the flight to Xinjiang without contacting any authorities. After arriving at the 
airport in Urumqi he was stopped by Chinese police who took notice of Shaikh due to his 
anxious behavior. They performed a security check on him in the airport, and in a hidden 
compartment of the bag given to him by Okole, they found 4kg of heroin- Shaikh claimed no 
knowledge of these illegal drugs. When Okole failed to show on the following flight, Shaikh was 
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arrested. He spent the next two years as a prisoner of the Chinese state before being executed for 
this crime. 
 According to Chinese law, foreign nationals arrested within Chinese borders are to be 
treated and prosecuted the same as domestic criminals- however, the embassy of that person’s 
country is to be promptly notified (Ministry of Public Security). In the case of Akmal Shaikh, 
Britain was not notified for an entire year (Townsend). His arrest took place less than a year prior 
to Beijing’s much-anticipated 2008 Olympics, and with unwanted international attention already 
on sensitive issues such as the CPC’s policies regarding Tibet and Taiwan, it is possible that this 
was a calculated decision meant to prevent further human rights criticism. In his first trial, held 
in November 2007 before his arrest was made known abroad, he was defended by Chen Dong, 
director of the government-funded Urumqi Legal Aid Center. Chen’s defense was that Shaikh 
had committed the crime unaware, but the trial (which lasted only 30 minutes) ended with 
Shaikh being found guilty of smuggling illegal drugs into the country, a serious crime in China 
punishable by death (Qiu). Chinese law recommends the death penalty for smuggling heroin in 
excess of 50 grams, and Shaikh was carrying eighty times that amount. Ultimately, after two 
failed appeals, he was sentenced to death- the first European national to receive such a sentence 
since Antonio Riva, an Italian citizen found guilty of plotting to murder Mao Zedong (this plot 
was later admitted by government officials to have been fabricated), was executed in 1951 
(Dikötter, 104). According to British media, it was only once the sentence had been made that 
Britain was finally notified of Shaikh’s situation (Townsend). His conviction was upheld in a 
sequence of appeals, including the Supreme People’s Court. This conviction sparked an 
international debate between two of the world’s greatest powers at the very highest levels of 
government. Despite fervent efforts from both the British government and multiple non-
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governmental organizations (NGOs) to alter his fate, the Chinese court’s conviction was 
approved in multiple courts of appeals, including the Supreme People’s Court, and Shaikh 
eventually met his end via lethal injection on December 29, 2009. Once his life was no longer 
rescuable, the same British politicians who denounced the ruling found it necessary to move on 
and put the unpleasant incident behind it for the sake of maintaining good relations with China. 
Besides numerous petitions to the Chinese ambassador in London and personal requests from 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Britain took no action in response to Shaikh’s execution. Within 
months, his death passed from the public eye, seen by Britons as just another one of China’s 
human rights abuses, albeit one that had a more personal sting. While Shaikh may be dead and 
his case no longer the sensational political hot issue that it was for over a year, it can provide us 
with valuable insights regarding China’s sovereignty. 
 There are three main factors making Akmal Shaikh’s case noteworthy. The first is that he 
was a Muslim of South Asian background, and his arrest and execution occurred in China’s 
western Xinjiang province, which is a predominantly Muslim region that has experienced 
decades of unrest. Culturally, the local Uighur population (also spelled “Uyghur”- one of China’s 
55 ethnic minorities yet a majority in many parts of Xinjiang) is very different from the Han, 
who make up roughly 93% of China’s total population (Worden, Savada, and Dolan). In 
Xinjiang, traditionally Muslim ethnic groups like the Kazakh, the Hui, and the Uighurs (who are 
the largest single ethnic group in the province) make up over half of the population (Worden, 
Savada, and Dolan). A recent influx of Han migrants and the anti-religious stance of the CPC 
have contributed to growing tensions in the region. One recent and dramatic example of this was 
the July 2009 riots that took place in Urumqi, where approximately 200 Uighur citizens were 
killed and many more arrested in the wake of largescale protests against government 
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mistreatment (Wikipedia contributors). China’s official stance on the frequent ethnic conflicts 
ascribes blame to separatist movements which it has painted as akin to terrorist movements such 
as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. The fact that the majority of the people pushing for independence (or, in 
the case of many Uighurs, better economic conditions and more political autonomy) are Muslim 
has played into the government’s hand, in that protesters of any issue can easily be labeled 
religious extremists. For Akmal Shaikh to be caught breaking a serious law in the capital of 
Xinjiang during a period of rising ethnic tensions, his identity as a non-Han Muslim certainly did 
him no favors.  
 The second factor that makes Shaikh’s case worth examining, perhaps the one most 
responsible for making Akmal Shaikh a figure of global importance, was his British citizenship. 
Anytime a person commits a crime or is arrested in a country other than the one in which they 
hold citizenship, the matter evolves beyond a domestic issue. Oftentimes, the country where the 
crime has been committed will choose not to hand the accused over to their home country 
because they suspect that the punishment they would receive there would be less severe. This 
was certainly the case with Shaikh, as the death penalty is not even an extant procedure in Great 
Britain. From the mainstream Chinese point of view,2 releasing him to Britain would have almost 
certainly resulted in a failure to properly punish a guilty criminal.  
It is not unusual for the prosecuting and sentencing of a foreigner abroad to create tension 
between countries when the countrymen of the accused feel that they are not guilty. But rarely do 
such cases result in as much international disagreement and conflict as did Shaikh’s case, and 
this is largely because of the third factor: Shaikh’s mental health. The main argument of those 
who opposed his execution was that Shaikh was suffering from mental illness, and therefore 
                                                          
2 As observed in online comments, and reported in government surveys and publications. 
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carrying out the death penalty on him would be a human rights violation, as per the 1997 UN 
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions (“Death Penalty and 
Mental Illness”). The claim that Shaikh was mentally ill, had it been proven, would have 
supported the defense used by his Chinese lawyers: that he was unaware of the drugs he was 
carrying, having been unwittingly chosen by smugglers who targeted him because his mental 
condition made him easy to exploit. Realizing after his first trial that the possibility of having the 
court recognize Shaikh as being mentally ill was his only chance to escape punishment, his new 
lawyers- Cao Hong and Qi Lei- attempted to have his mental health be tested. Shaikh himself 
was initially opposed to undergoing such a test, adamant that he was mentally fit, but ultimately 
conceded to his lawyers. This request however was not granted by the courts, meaning that in the 
eyes of the law, Shaikh was fully responsible for his crime. For the Chinese authorities, reports 
of “erratic behavior” by friends and family and guessed diagnoses from foreign doctors who 
never met him did not warrant further investigation (Jones). The fact that neither Shaikh nor any 
of his family members possessed medical records of mental illness was enough settle the issue, 
and so despite protests from abroad that more should have been done to determine Shaikh’s 
mental health, he was ultimately convicted as a man fully responsible for his crime. 
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Chapter 3 
The Death Penalty and Rule of Law in Contemporary China 
The uncertainty surrounding Shaikh’s mental health would not have made his case 
exceptional were it not for his foreign citizenship. China has long been criticized for its extensive 
use of the death penalty- it is estimated that 99% of people arrested for a crime in China are 
found guilty (Congressional-Executive Commission on China), with thousands of criminals 
receiving capital punishment each year (Death Penalty Database, China). Despite the existence 
of laws meant to protect mentally ill criminals, the mental health of those convicted is rarely 
taken into account. A Chinese man convicted of murdering eleven people in gruesome fashion 
and seriously injuring two others was executed in Shaanxi in December of 2006, despite serious 
concerns from Chinese psychiatrists regarding his mental state (Ma and Zhu). Another Chinese 
man of questionable mental health, Yang Jia, was executed only a year and one month before 
Shaikh (Du). Sentenced for having killed six police officers with Molotov cocktails, Yang’s 
attorney requested that he be examined for mental illness, but the request, like the one made by 
Shaikh’s lawyer, was rejected. While cases such as these will usually result in condemnation 
from NGOs like Reprieve and Amnesty International, and sometimes even prompt cautious 
criticism from domestic voices, they do not evolve into issues of tense international debate. The 
reason Shaikh’s case became such a debate is that his innocence (or at least, the potentially 
extenuating factor of his mental state) was being argued for not only by NGOs but by the 
government of Great Britain, which denounced the Chinese state’s prosecution of their own 
citizen as be a miscarriage of justice. But it was the crucial factor that the British person being 
executed appeared to many to be mentally ill that fueled Britain’s outrage. If Shaikh were a 
smuggler of undisputedly sound mental health, disappointment in his execution would likely 
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have been voiced by the British government, but it would have had to have recognized that 
China was in fact sentencing him in accord with its own laws, which clearly state that the death 
penalty can be expected for carrying over 50 grams of heroin into the country. There would have 
been no real ground for protest beyond the common refrain that China should abolish its death 
penalty, a request Chinese leaders have had no qualms in dismissing over the years, dismissively 
reminding their critics that other “developed” nations like Japan and the U.S. also use capital 
punishment (Miao). What British officials found unique in this case was the fact that China’s 
own laws clearly state that sufferers of severe mental illness cannot be sentenced with the death 
penalty (Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China). The category of “severe mental 
illness” that can mitigate a defendant’s sentence according to Chinese law includes bipolar 
disorder (Ng, 424), which is what Shaikh’s defenders proposed he was afflicted with. However, 
this diagnosis was hypothesized solely on the conjecture of observers who had no opportunity to 
personally examine Shaikh, such as Dr. Peter Schaapveld, a British forensic psychiatrist 
consulted by Reprieve (Cohen). And so from the British perspective, it appeared as though 
Chinese courts were purposefully ignoring their own legal system in order to attain a guilty 
verdict for Shaikh. By calling for an overturning of his death sentence, Shaikh’s defenders 
portrayed themselves as trying to hold China accountable to its own laws. 
This raises the issue of rule of law in China. Despite significant progress over the past 
four decades from the early years of the PRC when law was denounced as an instrument of class 
oppression (Minas), rule of law is still not a reality in contemporary China. An interesting 
anecdote that illustrates this was provided to me in a conversation with a Chinese professor of 
law. He told me about a time when he was consulted in a situation where a family whose money 
had been mishandled by a bank subsequently held the bank employees hostage. Even when 
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police arrived to mediate the situation and told them their losses would be redressed if they sued 
the bank in court, the family refused to leave. They were unconvinced that attempting to get their 
money back in court would be successful, reflecting a distrust of the judicial system that is 
widespread in China. The professor was asked to help resolve the situation by an officer who 
was a former student, and it turned out that the professor was related through marriage to one of 
the family members. As such, he was a valid member of their extended family, and was seen by 
them as trustworthy. When he repeated the police’s advice that they would indeed win the court 
decision if they simply followed standard procedure and sued the bank, the family needed no 
further convincing. They left, and the conflict was resolved.  
This incident shows the lack of faith Chinese citizens have in their own country’s legal 
system. This distrust is not unwarranted, as connections often trump the law in China. Indeed, as 
the story continued, the professor mentioned to me that even if the judge who eventually 
presided over the case felt that the family did not deserve the reimbursement on legal grounds, 
the fact that the judge was one of his former students as well guaranteed the family victory in 
court, since he wouldn’t pass a judgment like this against the family of his professor. Without 
rule of law, significant political decisions in China such as the executing of a foreign citizen 
around whom there is international debate can be understood as the realization of the desires of 
those in power instead of an unbiased application of existing laws. To confirm this, one only 
needs look at the manner in which Chinese media covered the case. In the immediate aftermath 
of Shaikh’s execution, multiple official media organizations within China published articles in 
strong defense of the courts’ decision. Xinhua published an article providing testimonies from 
multiple Chinese legal experts in support of the ruling- the very title of the article declared the 
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execution to be “lawful and reasonable” (Miao)3. The article goes on to state that the Supreme 
People’s Court was correct in asserting that the British opposition to Shaikh’s execution did not 
provide enough evidence to support the notion that Shaikh was mentally ill, and thus by 
executing him, the Chinese government was both staying true to the law and standing strong 
against foreign pressure (Miao). A few days after this article, Sina, another major news 
organization tightly controlled by the government, published a lengthy article detailing Shaikh’s 
life story, his arrest and subsequent trials, as well as reaffirming the appropriateness of his 
sentence. Officials working within the Urumqi court system who interacted with Shaikh during 
his two years in prison were quoted as saying “his behavior was very normal”4 in denial of 
suggestions that Shaikh was mentally ill (Qiu). The strong defense of the courts’ decision found 
in these and other Chinese news articles are reliable confirmation that the execution was 
approved of by Party leadership, as “media transmissions about law carry a great deal of 
authoritative weight” (Lee, 438). Tahirih V. Lee’s research on the usage of official news outlets 
by the Chinese government shows that “the media transmissions of stories and interpretations of 
the law rank second only to Supreme People's Court opinions” (Lee, 480). She concludes that to 
an extent, “media transmissions in the PRC function as sources of law” (Lee, 480). We can 
therefore interpret the media coverage of Shaikh’s execution, which was strongly affirmed the 
decision, as an accurate reflection of the will of Party leadership.  
 
 
 
                                                          
3 In the original Chinese: “he fa he li 合法合理.” Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Chinese to English 
are my own. 
4 In the original Chinese: “ta de juzhi hen zhengchang 他的举止很正常.” 
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Chapter 4 
The Historical Memories Shaping Chinese Views of Akmal Shaikh 
This leads us to the question of why China’s leaders would want to execute Akmal 
Shaikh. If China’s own laws regarding the mental health of criminals allowed for at least the 
chance of a lighter sentence, in favor of which there was considerable international pressure, and 
if the law itself can be bypassed, then why did China endanger its important trade relationship 
with Britain and risk attracting more critiques of its human rights policy over one man? The 
answer, I argue, is that for the Chinese government and the Chinese people, Akmal Shaikh was 
not just any man- rather, he represented the nation of Great Britain, along with its past crimes 
against China. For observers familiar with Chinese history, Shaikh’s case had strong echoes of 
the Opium Wars of the 19th century. These echoes were quickly seized upon by the Chinese 
public and repeatedly broadcast by the state-run media. A failure to understand this history and 
its impact on modern China would be to completely miss the significance of this case for the 
Chinese people. By seeing Akmal Shaikh’s case from the Chinese perspective, I argue we can 
understand that they viewed the issue as a challenge to China’s sovereignty and national honor. 
Instead of being a stand-alone case, Shaikh’s was framed within China as the latest in a long line 
of instances where Britain had tried to impose its way on China. 
This history into which Shaikh’s case fit so neatly goes back to the First Opium War, “the 
traumatic inauguration of [China’s] modern history,” when the British used their military 
superiority to force the Qing Empire to concede to their demands for greater economic 
cooperation and diplomatic rights, among other conditions that the Chinese found 
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disadvantageous (Lovell, 9).5 This conflict marked the beginning of China’s “century of 
humiliation,” the period lasting up until the end of China’s civil war in 1949 during which 
numerous wars, rebellions, and other calamities caused millions of deaths, as well as a long-
lasting breakdown in political order. A significant aspect of the “century of humiliation” is 
extraterritoriality, the judicial system instituted by the Treaty of the Bogue that exempted British 
citizens from Chinese law for over a century. General Regulation XIII of the Treaty of the Bogue 
declares: “Regarding the punishment of English criminals, the English Government will enact 
the laws necessary to attain that end, and the Consul will be empowered to put them in force; and 
regarding the punishment of Chinese criminals, these will be tried and punished by their own 
laws” (Treaty of the Bogue). While it has been over seventy years since British extraterritoriality 
in China ended, the strongly negative reactions to British attempts to save Shaikh show how its 
memory still plays a role in contemporary politics.  
Extraterritoriality, or “extrality” as it is commonly abbreviated by contemporary scholars, 
is defined by Turan Kayaoglu as “a legal regime whereby a state claims exclusive jurisdiction 
over its citizens in another state” (Kayaoglu, 9). It is worth drawing attention to how closely this 
definition aligns with the concept of legal imperialism, which Kayaoglu summarizes as “the 
extension of a state’s legal authority into another state and limitation of legal authority of the 
target state over issues that may affect people, commercial interest, and security of the imperial 
state” (Kayaoglu, 6). While China was never officially colonized during the 19th century, it was 
undeniably a target and victim of the imperialist appetites of Europeans and the Japanese 
throughout the “century of humiliation.” And systems of extrality were one of the main tools of 
imperialism, as its existence legitimizes the superiority of the former state’s legal system while 
                                                          
5 For a detailed account of the First Opium War, see: Lovell, Julia. The Opium War. London: Picador, 2011.  
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allowing for the society of the target state to be influenced by ideas and rules from abroad. In the 
decades between the First Opium War and the beginning of the 20th century, the Qing Dynasty 
went from having no official systems of extrality to having conceded the privilege to nearly two-
dozen foreign countries, including powers such as Britain, France, and Japan, but also relatively 
weaker states like Norway and Brazil that would certainly have not been able to attain such a 
privilege were it not for the work of other stronger states setting a precedent of foreigners being 
exempt from Chinese law.6 As a result of these concessions, unwanted foreign products and 
ideas began flooding into China, and the foreigners responsible for these new and combustive 
imports were outside the reach of Chinese law. 
While the European justification for imposing systems of extrality upon China was 
ostensibly innocent enough- the protection of their own citizens from what they considered to be 
“barbaric” punishments and abuses of the law- the result was undeniably exploitative of China. 
On the economic level it gave European nations a trade advantage by allowing them to proceed 
with commercial activity that China’s rulers disapproved of, such as opium importation. Their 
traders now enjoyed a much more favorable position than they had previously experienced under 
the Ming and early Qing. Without the fear of being unfairly subjected to what they saw as cruel 
and unusual punishments, more foreign merchants found doing business in China to be an 
agreeable pursuit, and so they increased in number (as did Christian missionaries) and spread 
across the empire. Furthermore, those merchants now found themselves possessing an elite status 
in Chinese society. Pre-extrality foreigners had to be kept on a tight leash by their superiors lest 
they get in trouble (through their own fault or by accident) and cause yet another struggle with 
                                                          
6 For more information regarding the history of extrality, consult: Edwards, Randle R. “Ch’ing Legal Jurisdiction 
Over Foreigners.” In Essays on China’s Legal Tradition, edited by Jerome Alan Cohen, R. Randle Edwards, and Fu-
mei Chang Chen, 222-268. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981. Also see: Scully, Eileen P. Bargaining with 
the State from Afar. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. 
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the Qing officials, and they knew that while there was the possibility of them being saved from 
Chinese punishment, this was by no means certain. Whereas with systems of extrality in place, 
foreigners could now roam the land (the unequal treaties made it possible for foreigners to 
penetrate the once-prohibited Chinese interior) with relative impunity, knowing that their 
government would provide them favorable treatment were they to get into trouble. This is not to 
say that Western governments encouraged or even tolerated misbehavior by their subjects in 
China- extraterritorial courts in China saw the privilege of dealing with their own citizens as a 
burden in of itself and tried to prevent them from causing trouble (Scully, 44). But Western 
citizens certainly enjoyed a change of status through this legislation. Extrality effectively 
transformed them from lowly outsiders who could run and hide from the law, to empowered 
bodily representatives of their militarily superior homelands. Not only did extrality elevate 
foreign individuals to a superior position in China, it also constituted a serious attack on Chinese 
sovereignty. The Qing officials who agreed to the terms of extrality were unaware of this deeper 
violation, but it is where the true significance of extrality lies and it is why sovereignty in China 
today is such an intensely guarded right.  
There are few words in the science of foreign policy that are more commonly used and 
yet more often oversimplified and misunderstood as “sovereignty.” It is simultaneously “the 
fundamental principle of international politics” (Tok, 6) without which our contemporary world 
system would fall apart, and yet also “an essentially contestable concept” 7 (Besson, 5) that no 
state can put into perfect practice (Tok, 27). Indeed, while many politicians assume that the word 
is understood to have the same meaning for all people, it is “an ever-changing concept” whose 
“very definition and interpretation shifts with the contexts it applies to, as well as the historical 
                                                          
7 Italics in original. 
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period in which it was defined” (Tok, 23). Not only has the concept changed over time, 
sovereignty is also understood in different ways by different contemporary governments.8 At 
their most basic level, contemporary notions of sovereignty share the assertion that it is power 
(often imbued with a sense of a right to that power) held by a governing body to make decisions 
on nearly any aspect of the lives of the individual members of that body- indeed, it is “is the 
power of life and death” in the hands of the state (Kahn, 4). Alexander William Salter calls it “an 
individual or body party to political exchange that does not rest on third-party enforcement” 
(Salter, 79). And Carl Schmitt posited that the sovereign is “he who decides on the exception” 
(Schmitt, 5), which is particularly apt if we interpret the Chinese courts’ refusal to consider 
Shaikh’s mental health as a decision to deviate from standard legal procedure.  
While the details and limits of these criteria are contested by academics and governments 
alike (and I will explore later how sovereignty as understood by contemporary Chinese leaders is 
unique), most work from this shared foundation, a foundation that was being formed in the 19th 
century. As heir and participants in the culture of European Christendom that produced this 
broad concept of sovereignty, British merchants and diplomats carried a specific worldview into 
19th century Asia, expecting the rulers they encountered to accept their view of the world and 
challenging those that resisted. Certainly people in the Qing Empire of 1839 held a very different 
view of state power and authority than did the British at the time the two countries clashed over 
the right to ban or import opium. Entering the 19th century, Chinese rulers did not make clear 
distinctions between the various European states who were expanding their own empires up to 
China’s doorstep. Nor did they consider any other state in the world China’s equal, in terms not 
                                                          
8 For an discussion of sovereignty as a social construct and process, see: Biersteker, Thomas J., and Cynthia Weber. 
“The Social Construction of State Sovereignty.” State Sovereignty as Social Construct. Ed. Thomas J. Biersteker 
and Cynthia Weber. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 1-21.  
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only of power but also essence. This was a reflection of the tianxia (天下) system, which was the 
dominant cultural understanding of the world in China from ancient times into the early modern 
period. This system was different from contemporary European understandings of the world in 
that the structure was not founded on absolute control over territory, but on “the moral and 
cultural superiority of the Chinese civilisation” (Tok, 36). Despite being a way of understanding 
sovereignty, it was not as concerned with territorial boundaries as European sovereignty was, as 
all lands were in theory at least under the emperor’s authority. One other significant difference 
was that besides China, “there were no parallel supreme authorities possible” (Tok 36), meaning 
that the early British attempts to negotiate as equals were interpreted by the Qing rulers as 
misguided and audacious. The British who encountered the tianxia system found the Chinese 
insistence on their innate superiority similarly audacious, especially once it became clear that the 
Chinese state lacked the military strength to vindicate that sense of sovereignty. After this vision 
of the world was shaken by China’s comprehensive military defeat to England in the First Opium 
War, Chinese leaders and thinkers spent the decades leading to the eventual Qing collapse in the 
study of European political literature, through which they adopted this foreign concept of 
sovereignty. Over twenty years after the end of the First Opium War, a full Chinese translation of 
Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law published as wanguo gongfa (万国公法) was 
completed and thus Qing officials (who had been studying translated sections of the text since 
the 1850s) could gain a clearer sense of the details of this new system (Tok, 40). Even with such 
translation projects, processing an entirely new foreign view of the world was a gradual process. 
When Chinese officials tortured and killed members of British diplomatic envoy Harry Parkes’ 
entourage (in blatant violation of European norms for how diplomats were to be treated) during 
the Second Opium War, Anglo-French troops retaliated by burning and looting the 
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Yuanmingyuan (圆明园, “Gardens of Perfect Brightness,” now known as the Old Summer 
Palace). As seen in this and other episodes from the late 19th century, European nations had the 
will to force their norms upon China as well as the power to punish deviations from those norms. 
In the final years of the Qing Dynasty and throughout the Republican Period, Chinese officials 
used this somber motivation and their ever-increasing knowledge about the world outside their 
borders to operate within the same international framework as Europe and Japan.  
One of the greatest motivating factors in this process of change was the desire to remove 
the systems of extrality that had been imposed upon China through humiliating military and 
diplomatic defeats. Beyond the economic and social advantages that extrality gave Westerners, 
extrality also set a stark power dichotomy in place between China and the Western states 
managing the systems. China’s leaders could be bossed around by foreign rulers who tested the 
limits of their power by making increasingly invasive demands upon them and denying them the 
right to apply their own laws within their own borders. The more that Chinese scholars and 
officials learned about the European view of the world and their concept of sovereignty, the 
clearer it became that extrality was effectively a denial of China’s right to exercise sovereignty. 
Sovereignty exists where there are “at least two supreme authorities sharing a clear, enforced 
border between them,” a border “dividing the internal from the external” (Tok, 30). Extrality 
violates that border. With the privilege of legal immunity from Chinese law, foreigners protected 
under systems of extrality showed that the Chinese state did not have complete authority over its 
own territory and thus blurred the line between internal and external. And for sovereignty to be 
denied to China was a serious statement by the governments behind extrality on the inferiority of 
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the Chinese state and legal system.9 As long as extrality existed, China did not have full 
sovereignty over its territory. Adding insult to injury was the fact that China lacked sovereignty 
because other states determined that China was not deserving of it (like Japan proved itself to be 
only four decades after encountering those same states). This judgment of inferiority is a major 
part of the “century of humiliation,” one that the PRC since its founding has striven to 
compensate for, as I will discuss further on. 
Japan’s success in getting rid of their systems of extrality in 189410 through the major 
systematic changes that constituted the Meiji Restoration showed Chinese policymakers that by 
making adjustments to fit Western norms, freedom from extrality was possible. With that 
freedom came full sovereignty and equality (or something approaching it) in the international 
system, with which came the coveted ability to resist foreign aggression and influence. And so 
Chinese continually fought against the extrality systems imposed upon them with “a vehement 
and occasionally violent” opposition that ranged from public protests to diplomatic tug-of-wars 
(Kayaoglu, 149). Early efforts by the Qing government to convince Western nations of the need 
to end extrality included attempts to point out its ineffectiveness in maintaining control of 
foreigners in China. Somewhat ironically, these protests were met not with extrality’s abolition, 
but rather a bolstering of its reach, such as in the U.S. Court for China Act of 1906, which only 
intensified American control over its citizens in China and made the extrality court system more 
similar to the American system (Kayaoglu, 152). The Qing rulers then focused on legal reform. 
Since the original Western desire for extrality arose from a sense that China’s laws were unfair 
and not properly institutionalized, and that this judgment of China’s “backwardness” remained 
                                                          
9 Some schools of international relations such as the realist school even consider sovereignty “the fundamental 
principle of international politics” (Tok, 6) without which a state is not a true state. 
10 These agreements would not take effect until five years later 
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the justification for the propitiation of the systems, the perception developed among China’s 
leaders that they could bring about an end to extrality by correcting the aspects of their legal 
system that the Western nations considered problematic. An example of this can be seen when in 
redrafting the Qing Code in 1907, the repealing of certain laws (such as the law criminalizing 
female fornication) was proposed, due to a recognition that Western countries lacked similar 
laws, and therefore by eliminating laws that were frowned upon in the West China could gain a 
stamp of approval and prove that extrality was no longer needed (Yeung, 303). Such acts were 
encouraged by the British themselves. The Mackay Treaty of 1902 promised that “Great Britain 
agrees to give every assistance to such reform, and she will also be prepared to relinquish her 
extraterritorial rights when she is satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangement for 
their administration, and other conditions warrant her in doing so” (Kayaoglu, 153). The 
seemingly kindhearted attitude expressed in this statement obscures the reality that China’s 
sovereignty was still very much in the hands of people outside of its own borders with interests 
contrary to those of the Chinese. It would be for Great Britain, and all other nations who enjoyed 
extrality in China, to decide exactly when China met their vague standards. 
Ironically, the long-awaited end to extrality eventually occurred at a time when Chinese 
opposition to it was at its least vocal- the early 1940s, an entire century after the first system of 
extrality was set into place by the British. Opposition was subdued because the country was 
gripped by both civil war and fighting the Japanese invasion that had torn the country apart and 
made the normal functioning of courts almost impossible, and the priority for Chinese leaders 
was simply survival. Scholars have theorized as to why Britain and the US chose this time to end 
their systems of extrality. Kayaoglu places the greatest explanatory power on the systemic legal 
changes that had taken place during the 1930s in KMT-controlled China. He argues that the legal 
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reforms that had been implemented by the early 1940’s successfully provided the 
institutionalized “modern” legality that was expected of nations at the time (Kayaoglu, 186). 
With this interpretation, it would seem as though British officials, deeming that China’s legal 
system had been sufficiently modeled in its own image, were content to relinquish their 
privileges since there were no longer serious enough differences to justify maintaining them. 
Others have interpreted the act somewhat more cynically, reading it as a response to Japanese 
war propaganda in China that argued that the Allies were imperialists and extrality proved this. 
Removing extrality was therefore a measure taken to prevent the loss of Chinese support in the 
war.11 Another factor that is important to consider is the Allies’ desire for a strong post-war 
China that could help block Soviet influences in Asia.12 Whatever the actual reason, both Britain 
and America notified Chiang Kai-shek’s government of their decision to end extrality in October 
of 1942, on the condition that China would continue to develop its legal system in the same 
institutionalizing direction, and provide the Allies with favorable economic treatment. Within 
three years, WWII had ended and the victorious Allies aimed to continue molding the world in 
their own image. This mission gained added momentum from the efforts of the Soviet Union to 
spread its own ideology. Over the next half-century, Britain, America, and their allies would 
portray themselves as defenders of liberty, selflessly fighting for the right of small countries to 
be free from the interference of those (the Soviets) that would meddle in internal affairs. The 
irony here of course is that they were not innocent of such meddling, as seen most blatantly in 
Vietnam and Korea, as well as in the post-war occupation of Japan and West Germany. This 
irony was not lost on the Chinese. Soon after extrality was ended in China, Mao Zedong’s 
victorious Chinese Communist Party (the CCP, now called the Communist Party of China, or the 
                                                          
11 Kayaoglu looks at these and other interpretations in Legal Imperialism, pages 179-190. 
12 Michael B. Yahuda gives a good summary of this factor in The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific (1996). 
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CPC), established the People’s Republic of China in 1949. From its beginnings in the 1920s, the 
CPC positioned itself against extrality and attacked the KMT for its reliance on the very 
countries that were denying China its sovereignty. To the CPC, Britain and America remained 
imperialists, even during the 1930s when they found themselves grudgingly working together to 
fight the more pertinent enemy of the Japanese. The removal of extrality did nothing to change 
this view. When Mao Zedong proclaimed “We have stood up,” he was communicating to the 
world that China’s new government would not allow itself to be subjected to the impositions of 
foreign governments (Wang, 84).  Non-communist foreign governments were repeatedly 
denounced in official speeches and demonstrations. While the last of the foreign extrality 
systems had ended before the founding of the PRC, “Western imperialism” remained a useful 
enemy on which to blame China’s impoverished state and against which to mobilize Mao’s 
policies. It was a useful enemy, because frustration remained over the exploitative policies that 
foreign governments had imposed on China for a century. I argue that Chinese frustration at this 
century-long history of extrality- its violent beginning and degrading end, as well as the 
manipulative nature of the whole process- is still used by the government as a means of 
consolidating public support of the CPC. In instances like Akmal Shaikh’s execution where 
foreign governments critique Chinese policy, the government is quick to frame the issue as a 
continuation of imperialist attempts to bully China. First, however, a brief overview of the 
unique contemporary Chinese interpretation of sovereignty is necessary. 
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Chapter 5 
Contemporary Chinese Sovereignty 
As previously mentioned, the definition of sovereignty varies from country to country. 
No one country’s understanding of the concept can be called the definitive version, as it is very 
much a construct subject to change as thinkers and politicians continually redefine what it means. 
One area in which much mutation has occurred over the past century is in determining how much 
control the governing body should have over the people under its authority. Historically, the 
treatment of a people by their government mattered little- oppressive regimes were the norm, and 
human rights issues would not become the global issue that it is today until after WWII. Up to 
that point, human rights had been growing as a topic of debate: at the turn of the last century, 
publicized accounts of human rights abuses in the Belgian Congo were met with widespread 
condemnation, and the political actions that followed were arguably the first human rights protest, 
as well as one of the first times that political discussion centered around a state’s treatment of its 
own people. But following the horrors of the Holocaust that came to light following WWII and 
showed the devastation that could be wrought by an oppressive modern regime, the Allies 
responsible for shaping the post-war order began treating the issue of human rights as a serious 
issue. The idea of “crimes against humanity” was introduced in the Nuremberg War Crimes 
Trials of 1945, and by condemning Nazi Germany’s human rights violations, the victorious 
Allies not only further justified their own actions in the war- they also set a precedent for the 
importance of human individuals in contrast with the state, a precedent that would be set into 
international law in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Department of 
State). This list of rights, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948, established that human 
rights abuses would henceforth be treated as “a matter of legitimate international concern” 
 - 26 - 
 
(Department of State). While there still exist regimes such as Burma and North Korea that 
systematically violate international human rights norms, they are now the exception, and much 
pressure is put on such regimes to change their ways. These values are reflected in how 
sovereignty is understood in Britain and America. In these countries, there has been a 
development in the past couple decades for “more expansive exceptions to state sovereignty” 
(Burke-White, 50), with the rights of individuals becoming more important.  
In contrast, the Chinese government holds claim to “a more absolutist sovereignty” 
(Burke-White, 50), where the authority of the state over the people within its territory extends 
over nearly every aspect of life, and mainstream Chinese political thinking on the subject aligns 
closely with this idea.13 Multiple generations of Chinese leaders have responded to Western 
critiques of China’s human rights’ abuses by emphasizing the “master-slave” role of sovereignty 
and human rights (Tok, 63), stating that a lack of complete sovereignty will lead to chaos, which 
will then result in severe suffering. Therefore, what are perceived abroad as human rights abuses 
are in fact (from the CPC’s point of view), necessary lesser evils that are ensuring the success of 
the nation and preventing the far greater suffering that would result from abiding by international 
human rights standards. A well-known example of this is the government’s population regulation, 
because of which untold millions of women have had forced abortions and sterilization 
procedures performed on them in clear violation of international human rights norms (“The right 
to choose and refuse sterilization”)  This however, has been justified by the state as the necessary 
cost of preventing overpopulation- the CPC credits the policy as having prevented 400 million 
births- which according to Chinese scientists (relying upon the largely discredited work of Paul 
Ehrlich), would cause far more harm in the long run than the government’s course of action 
                                                          
13 Tok provides an overview of Chinese academic discussion on the concept of sovereignty in Managing China’s 
Sovereignty, pages 63-64 
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(Pandit). In the fall of 2015, much was made of the government’s decision to finally end the 
“One-Child” policy that had, since the late 70s, made it illegal for couples to have more than a 
single child (with exceptions) and punished with fines and forced sterilization those who did. 
While on the surface, the change seems to be a relinquishing of power by the state, the 
government still lays absolute authority over the reproductive rights of its people, an authority 
that extends so far as to be able to deny people the ability to bear children through forced 
medical procedures. Allowing two children instead of one is in no ways a renunciation of that 
power. In addition to people’s reproductive rights, the government also lays claim to the land 
people live on, frequently going so far as to forcibly remove residents from their homes and 
relocating them against their will. In Britain or America, such an action by the state would be 
loudly decried as a violation of the people’s rights by the government, but in China, it is the 
vested power of the government to do these things, and any attempts by foreign countries to 
criticize this situation is strongly resisted by the Chinese government. Even individuals within 
China who push for more individual liberties are frequently denounced as working in tandem 
with foreign governments to violate China’s sovereign authority over its people. Both in 
government practice and in academic discourse about sovereignty in China, the prevalent notion 
is that “the right to sovereignty is a right in itself … [that] should never be questioned nor denied, 
and should be defended at all cost” (Tok, 59). This challenges the popular notion in the West that 
globalization is making the traditional concept of sovereignty obsolete (Tok, 62). 
The authority claimed by the PRC government over its citizens pushes the limits of 
contemporary Western norms not only in its thoroughness, but also in its claims over Chinese 
outside of the Mainland. This was seen recently in the disappearances of five Hong Kong book 
publishers in October and December of 2015, who were widely interpreted to have been 
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abducted by PRC police for publishing gossip books that portrayed the CPC leadership in a 
negative light (Forsythe and Jacobs). Such activities are legally protected in Hong Kong, where 
the British-crafted government “has evolved to capture very different values, encompass a very 
different legislative/executive structure and operate within an alien legal system different from 
that in the Mainland” (Tok, 1). This is why the development was so shocking- it was an action 
that both violated Hong Kong’s sovereignty and claimed more authority over Hong Kong for the 
Mainland than is reflected in the legal agreement between the two (or at least, more than those 
upset by the Mainland’s actions interpret the law as allowing). While the Mainland government 
did not openly admit to having abducted the five from outside of China’s borders, the lack of 
alternative explanations as well as the trend of increasing Mainland control over Hong Kong (as 
protested in the Umbrella Protests) convey a unique Mainland interpretation to the “One Country, 
Two Systems” agreement, one where interference is acceptable despite being outside of the law. 
Said agreement is supposed to allow Hong Kong to continue governing itself by its own laws and 
government. The Mainland’s relationship with Taiwan is even more problematic: while Hong 
Kong was officially returned to the PRC in 1997, Taiwan (or the Republic of China) and the 
PRC have not succeeded to reach an agreement regarding their relationship since the ROC 
government retreated to Taiwan in 1949. Despite de jure recognition from less than two dozen 
states, most of them quite small, Taiwan effectively functions as an independent state completely 
separate from the Mainland (Friedman, 4). 
What may appear to be a violation of Hong Kong’s legal independence actually fits 
within the notion of sovereignty claimed by China. A “persistent peculiarity” found in China’s 
constitution is its claim of the responsibility to “protect the rights and interests of overseas 
Chinese” (Tok, 85). This belief was reflected in a statement by the Ministry of Education made 
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in January of 2016 and publicized the following month calling for an increase in “patriotic 
education”14 for overseas Chinese citizens, including students at foreign campuses (Ministry of 
Education). The statement expresses an official desire for a network of overseas Chinese that can 
help individuals “deeply feel the love and concern of the Motherland”15 (Ministry of Education). 
This “love and concern” can sometimes take a more sinister tone, as seen in the government’s 
monitoring of overseas Uighurs, the Muslim ethnic minority native to the province of Xinjiang 
where Shaikh was arrested and executed. Through spies, blackmail, and the coercion of family 
members back home, China’s intelligence service maintains a close watch over Uighur 
communities abroad, sensitive to their potential as rallying points for separatist movements 
(Mooney and Lague). Being outside of the Mainland’s borders does little to diminish the sense of 
China’s wide reach of sovereignty for the subjects of this intelligence campaign such as Kayum, 
Masimov, president of the Uyghur Canadian Society, who is quoted as saying: “Some might 
think that once you flee China, you are free. But you are never free” (Mooney and Lague). 
Clearly for the Chinese government, sovereignty is not entirely determined by territorial 
boundaries- whether in Hong Kong, Taiwan, or abroad, individuals deemed “Chinese” are at 
least to some degree perceived as being under the ultimate authority of the CPC.  
In understanding China’s contemporary idea of sovereignty, I have shown that it asserts 
extreme control over individuals that it deems to be under its authority, and that it does not 
equate territorial borders with an end of control. However, China’s version of sovereignty is not 
simply a matter of “more control,” nor does it fit cleanly within Western expectations of what 
“absolute” sovereignty should look like. Indeed, while many have attempted to neatly classify 
China’s interpretation of sovereignty as “Victorian” or “Westphalian” (given the fact that its 
                                                          
14 In the original Chinese: “aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu 爱国主义教育.” 
15 In the original Chinese: “chongfen ganshou zuguo guan ai 充分感受祖国关爱.” 
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extensive claims of control better resemble Western notions of sovereignty from the 19th century 
or before) such labels and even calling it an “absolutist” interpretation are misleading (Tok, 2). 
While the Chinese government shows a tendency to resist new interpretations of sovereignty that 
have been trending in the West for decades (ex: individual liberty, increased role of 
supranational organizations), its interpretation nevertheless differs significantly from 19th century 
European conceptions or even those of states similar to it like Russia, and not just in its claim of 
overseas Chinese. Just as European historical struggles with the Church produced the versions of 
sovereignty most common in the West, China’s history has shaped modern Chinese views of 
sovereignty and the international order. According to Tok, the tianxia system that guided 
Chinese notions of the world for millennia was not fully eradicated despite the fall of the Qing 
Dynasty and the influx of Western thinking over the past century and a half. Even with the 
efforts of officials to adopt the new Western understanding of the world system, processing an 
entirely new foreign view of the world was a gradual process. Old ideas of the world as 
understood in the tianxia system did not disappear overnight. Nor did they suddenly die out as 
soon as the old empire was replaced by a new modern republic. Tok argues that aspects of the 
tianxia system survived through the structural overhaul of the Republican era and through the 
anti-traditionalist purges of the PRC, and even “remains an important mind-map even for the 
politics of China today” (Tok, 46). Using Raymond Williams’ theory of dominant, residual, and 
emergent subcultures, Tok reasons that tianxia conceptions of the world, while no longer part of 
the dominant culture, have nevertheless remained present in the level of residual culture (Tok, 
45). He defends this claim by exploring the unique aspects of China’s understanding of 
sovereignty as it pertains to its relationship with Taiwan and Hong Kong, showing how the 
PRC’s seemingly contradictory claim that these functionally-independent regions are in fact 
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under its authority mirrors the bold claims of premodern emperors who saw themselves as 
holding sovereignty (in a sense different from how it is currently understood) over all of human 
existence. Their rule was absolute in their claims of sovereignty- literally “all under Heaven” 
was seen as under their authority- but in reality, application of this power was inconsistent and 
incomplete, especially as one moved outwards from the capital where the emperor’s power was 
most clearly vested. In these peripheral areas, acknowledgement of the center’s ultimate 
authority was more important than actual control (Tok, 35). What this means is that under the 
tianxia system, a high degree of autonomy in a region deemed peripheral by the center was 
acceptable, as long as the ideological authority of the center was not threatened by this autonomy. 
While a Western framework of international relations has become dominant in Chinese 
politics today, ideas of the tianxia system have remained in the consciousness of Chinese 
policymakers, not in the sense that they believe China is located at the center of the world, but in 
the sense that areas or peoples determined to be “peripheral” by the central government can be 
allowed a greater degree of autonomy, as long as they still pay homage to the ultimate authority 
vested in the center. We can understand this as “graded rings of sovereignty”: control “cascades 
outwards” from the core, where the central government’s control is strongest, through the second 
tier to the third tier- the periphery- where control is more nominal than actual (Tok, 3). Moving 
outwards from the center, de facto sovereignty becomes less important as long as de jure 
sovereignty remains unchallenged. Hong Kong is within the peripheral ring of Chinese 
sovereignty, in that its government and economy are allowed to operate mostly free of Mainland 
control (although lately there have been more political restrictions). Taiwan exists even further 
out on the peripheral ring, in that it has complete de facto sovereignty- while in Hong Kong, the 
Mainland government works with the local government, the Taiwanese government operates 
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completely independent of the Mainland. However, due to the Mainland government’s insistence 
that Taiwan is a “renegade state” (Friedman, 4) rather than an independent country (despite 
effectively existing as a de facto sovereign nation since 1949), any attempts to label Taiwan a 
separate nation are met with strong response from the Mainland.16 Meanwhile, acts that in 
practice clearly show Taiwan’s de facto independence, such as the regulation of immigrants from 
the Mainland in a manner that mirrors the immigration management of sovereign states, are 
tolerated as long as there is no challenge to Beijing’s de jure sovereignty (Friedman, 30). In her 
interviews with Taiwanese immigration officers, Friedman observed in her interviewees a strong 
desire to put a Taiwanese stamp on the passports of people coming from the Mainland, as the act 
of putting a stamp on a passport affirms the sovereignty of the stamping authority. Doing so 
would not alter the status quo proceedings, but it would nonetheless be a denial of Beijing’s de 
jure sovereignty. This simple act “weighted with significant import” is therefore off-limits to the 
Taiwanese bureaucrats who wish to assert their country’s independence (Friedman, 28). 
In explaining this unique situation, where de jure sovereignty does not match de facto 
realities, Tok highlights the adaptability of the Chinese approach. As long as the idea the central 
government possesses ultimate sovereignty is not challenged, de facto independence is 
acceptable. In this way, the Mainland government “flexibly accommodates, and at times, 
voluntarily concedes, a different mix of de facto rights according to each respective context and 
issue” (Tok, 3). Given the convenience afforded by maintaining graded rings of sovereignty, it 
may be that the process of gravitating towards a version of sovereignty that shares similarities 
with the older tianxia system was less an inheriting of historical tradition and more a strategic 
                                                          
16 One of the most dramatic examples of this was the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-96, where interaction 
between Taiwan and the U.S. implying Taiwanese de jure sovereignty prompted Chinese leadership to conduct 
missile tests in close proximity to Taiwan in a statement of its authority over Taiwan. 
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choice by CPC leadership, who found themselves in a difficult situation and discovered a way to 
tolerate it by using the international relations theory of an older era. Regardless of which 
explanation is truer, it is more germane for the discussion of the legal treatment of foreigners in 
China to find an answer to the question: why does the government concede some rights and 
refuse to compromise on others? Why are government officials comfortable with Hong Kong 
managing its own economy, a large amount of freedom, but is at the same time so uncomfortable 
with a publishing company slandering Xi Jinping that they deny five Hong Kong citizens (one of 
whom had duel Swedish citizenship) their legal right to publish freely? Why is Taiwan’s de facto 
independence from Mainland control tolerated, but the small action of putting a stamp on a 
passport is considered taboo? The answer lies in the PRC’s leaders’ desire to preserve their 
appearance of authority, both for other countries and for the Chinese public. This appearance- 
maintained through performances of sovereignty- is crucial in the CPC’s ongoing quest to 
maintain its legitimacy. Furthermore, the importance of this appearance helps explain why some 
cases involving foreign criminals are treated more severely than others. 
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Chapter 6 
Performances of Sovereignty: For Status and Stability 
In his book China’s Struggle for Status, Yong Deng argues that “international status” is a 
“major goal of foreign policy” for the PRC, a goal that is related to sheer military and political 
power and yet also distinct (Deng, 1). The very concept of status is loose and inexact: even 
though it is frequently used and referred to in Chinese politics and academia, it suffers from 
“scanty analysis” within China, perhaps due to its sensitive nature (Deng, 12-13). After all, if a 
Chinese scholar were to define “status” as anything contrary to government policy or beyond the 
reach of the PRC under the CPC, it could result in negative scrutiny. For the purposes of this 
article, we can understand the concept as a broad notion held by other countries’ leaders (and to a 
lesser extent, their people) regarding China’s right as a developed state to wield influence 
matching its power on the global stage. Part of this fixation has to do with the feeling within 
China that due to the long and rich cultural history of the Chinese people, anything less than 
regional power status is below what China deserves (Deng, 8). Considering that China existed as 
the dominant political power in East Asia for over two millennia, domestic scholarly 
interpretations of China’s recent rise to prominence on the world stage see this development as a 
return to normalcy. The “century of humiliation” which has so deeply affected the identity of the 
modern Chinese nation is therefore interpreted as a lengthy fluke that needs to be redressed, and 
a large part of that task is regaining status. It goes beyond economic or military power however- 
in both areas, China is far stronger than those of some of the G8 nations, but as it has only 
recently transitioned from the global periphery to the center, there remains a sense that China 
must prove itself. It is still “a non-status quo power, insofar as it must react to the international 
hierarchy” (Deng, 29). China is currently a rising power that nonetheless remains an outsider in 
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the “Western-dominated international hierarchy, which is buttressed by the U.S. hegemony,” and 
consequently its leaders have recognized the need for acceptance by the “in-group” of Western 
democracies (Deng, 2). Without such acceptance, Chinese leaders fear that their country will be 
vulnerable to exploitation as it had been for so long. If America does not recognize China’s 
dominant place in East Asia, it will continue to manipulate politics in the region for its own 
interests. If China’s neighbors do not recognize it as the Asian country with the highest status, 
they might be emboldened to challenge China’s claims of sovereignty, as Vietnam occasional 
has in the South China Sea. Historical memory of nearly a century of existing as a semi-colonial 
state has ensured that the Chinese will not forget the danger of being bullied by other countries. 
The country’s newfound power can help prevent that, but the recognition that others still make 
the rules means that China must show that it is strong. And so the goal is not just military and 
economic strength, but also status as a country that can help make the rules in the international 
system. 
Connected to the CPC’s quest to gain international respect is their quest to also maintain 
legitimacy in the eyes of the people. As an authoritarian government that had to wrest power 
violently away from the ruling party, the KMT, in a long and bloody civil war, legitimacy has 
always been a major concern for the CPC. For the first three decades of the PRC’s existence, it 
justified its rule as bringing about the revolution called for by Maoist communism. But in the 
wake of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms that changed China’s economy from a socialist system to a 
much more capitalist system, communism essentially lost its use as an ideology that could 
mobilize the public (Waldron). In its place, nationalism has been pushed by the government as a 
substitute ideology, but it is widely recognized that the true support for the CPC comes from the 
economic success it has brought the country. The CPC can continue its rule as the legitimate 
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governing party as long as the nation keeps profiting and gaining in status (the two of course are 
connected- the greater China’s status, the more easily it can promote its own interests). This need 
for legitimacy directly relates to the CPC leaders’ persistent fear of losing power. Domestic 
discontent with the PRC’s authoritarian style of government has at times exploded into national 
unrest (ex: the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests), and Chinese leaders are quick to crush any 
opposition that has the potential to create a similar situation. When totalitarian regimes across the 
Middle East (many of them allies of the PRC) fell one after another to populist protests for 
democratization in 2011, the Chinese government, fearing that it could be the next regime to go, 
silenced all domestic discussion of the so-called “Jasmine Revolution” in a widespread and 
prolonged censorship campaign. Any notion that the CPC has not raised China’s status to where 
it should be or is any other way illegitimate is targeted as a major threat by the government.  
In observing how the CPC works to enhance its status abroad and cement its legitimacy 
in the eyes of the people, we can find valuable insights through reading a diverse range of 
politics as performances of sovereignty, not solely ones that are explicitly dealing with the issue. 
Mark Laffey calls the category of foreign policy in its entirety “a specific kind of boundary 
producing political performance that draws upon available modes of representation in order to 
reproduce a particular mode of subjectivity” (Laffey, 431). I argue that domestic policy such as 
the prosecution of foreigners is also performative.17 Similar to how gender is performed by 
individuals within a society to give others a sense of whether a person identifies as male or 
female, political policy enacted by a state displays to its audience- both other states and 
individuals- information about that state and how it conceives of itself.18 This image is 
                                                          
17 This way of understanding performativity has roots in Judith Butler’s work on gender. For more information, see: 
Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble. New York: Routledge, 1990.  
18 In "Legal Performance and the Imagination of Sovereignty" (2006), Paul W. Kahn talks about how crucial legal 
performance is for maintaining the image of the state as an authority. 
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maintained through a diverse range of acts, from pounding a gavel to signify that the judge- 
representing the state- has made a decision of someone’s guilt, to major ceremonies held across 
the world meant to convey to viewers the power of the government behind the ceremony.19 Edyta 
Roszko in her work “Maritime territorialisation as performance of sovereignty and nationhood in 
the South China Sea” explores one such area of state action that should be read as performance. 
Specifically, she examines how China and Vietnam make competing claims of sovereignty over 
islands in the South China Sea, demonstrating how the very act of producing a map can be a bold 
statement of sovereignty, and thus a performance. By the simple act of drawing a line on an 
official piece of paper that encompasses contested territory, an official cartographer is making a 
statement visible to the world that their government owns that land (or maritime zone). Anyone 
who sees that map then can understand how that government perceives of itself in regards to its 
control over that area. I argue that the legal treatment of foreigners in China is similarly an area 
of state policy that holds information regarding China’s leaders and their view and performance 
of sovereignty.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 An example of this is the 2008 Beijing Olympics, which conveyed China’s new status to a global audience.  
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Chapter 7 
Foreigners as Material for Constructing the CPC’s Memory Project 
Western foreign individuals in China have long been unique bodies full of symbolic 
significance. In the years leading up to the Opium War, the limitations put upon them 
exemplified the Chinese emperor’s unique view of the world. Their vulnerability to Chinese 
punishment was used as a rhetorical justification of war. Throughout the following “century of 
humiliation,” the oppression of extrality was most clearly evident in the immunity of the 
foreigners who could now freely travel into China’s interior and bring their unwanted products 
and ideas with them. Foreigners were special- if they committed a crime against a Chinese, 
Chinese could not prosecute them. If a Chinese committed a crime against a foreigner, it would 
further justify the foreign powers’ view that China was a place in need of civilizing. They existed 
as symbolic reminders of China’s inferiority to other countries. By the time extrality was 
removed in the 1940s, there were very few European foreigners in the country to play this role. 
Nonetheless, when the CPC took power over the Mainland in 1949, they treated foreign 
individuals as representatives of their countries of origin, countries that still posed a threat in the 
post-extrality era. Consider for example the PRC’s policy regarding Christianity in the 1950’s. 
During the Republic Period, many foreign missionaries had petitioned their own governments to 
end extrality in China as they found it incompatible with Christian values and disliked the stigma 
of being associated with imperialism, which they saw as too worldly as well as harmful to their 
attempts at proselytizing (Bays). Despite this, the CPC labelled all foreign missionaries as 
imperialists and expelled them from the country in 1951, with the expulsion of nearly all 
foreigners- missionary or otherwise- being completed by 1953 (Dikötter, 114-115). The removal 
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of foreign bodies from the Mainland was a policy of considerable significance, as it conveyed 
China’s symbolic freedom from foreign interference. 
When the CPC under Deng Xiaoping opened China’s borders once again to foreign 
investment and knowledge in the 1980s, it was recognized by the Party that doing so could 
contradict its perennially useful anti-imperialism rhetoric. If the absence of foreigners from 
China meant independence, allowing their presence would have to communicate something other 
than a compromising of that independence. The solution was to keep much of the old rhetoric the 
same, especially the “us-versus-them” dichotomy that had driven their militaristic stance against 
foreigners up to that point. The change was portrayed as taking strategic advantage of the 
resources of the foreigners in order to make China strong against them. An official slogan 
adopted at this time- “using foreign strength to propagandize for China”20- reflects this attitude 
of engagement without allowing China to be put in a subservient role (Brady, 192). Instead, the 
opening to foreign ideas and investment was framed as the government reversing the old 
dynamic of Western countries taking Chinese resources for their own benefit. Thus, foreigners 
bringing new technologies and products into the country were portrayed symbolically not as 
intruding imperialists but as tools ultimately under the control of the government.   
I argue that in the study of foreigners as symbols in China, a crucial area to observe is 
how they are treated by the law. By which I mean- how does the law prescribe that foreigners 
who commit crimes should be treated, and how are they actually treated? The contrast between 
the two supports Tok’s theory that a central aspect of Chinese sovereignty is the existence of 
graded rings. When foreigners were allowed back into China at the time of Deng Xiaoping’s 
reforms, control over them was determined by the government to be a core issue, as revealed by 
                                                          
20 In the original Chinese: “liyong waili wei wo xuanchuan 利用外力为我宣传.” 
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the tight constraints over all foreigner movement. Throughout the 1980s, foreigners would be 
limited in where they could go, with official hotels being the only place they were permitted to 
stay. Not only were rules limiting foreigners’ freedoms while in China put in place, there were 
also strict guidelines for police regarding procedures in the event of a foreigner running afoul of 
the law. The Ministry of Public Security Procedural Requirements for Handling Criminal Cases 
(《公安机关办理刑事案件程序规定》Gong’an jiguan banli xingshi anjian chengxu guiding) 
required police dealing with foreign offenders to solicit advice from the foreign affairs office of 
the administrative region in which the crime took place in handling the case (Ministry of Public 
Security). As foreigners became more common in China, this amended in 1992 so that police no 
longer had to consult advice from superiors for each case (Ministry of Public Security). This 
change marked a shift in the way foreigners were perceived by the government in China, with de 
facto independence customary of those on the periphery becoming the norm.  
As is often the case with crimes in a society without full rule of law, crimes involving 
foreigner offenders tend to still be treated on a case-by-base basis. Except rather than being a 
question of whether or not the crime is reported to higher authorities, the question today is 
whether or not full legal action will be taken if a foreigner is caught breaking a law, or if the 
incident will even be reported at all. In correspondence with the aforementioned Chinese 
professor of law, he told me that in the event of a white foreigner’s arrest, Chinese police will 
give them comparatively fairer treatment and that overall, they are treated better. This reflects 
not just the unique status of foreigners in China, but also the lack of rule of law, as the actual law 
in China calls for equal treatment regardless of where a person is from. The fact is though that 
foreigners who break the law are in general more likely to be shown leniency from police than 
would average Chinese citizens. This perception- that the police are partial and cannot be trusted 
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to act in accordance with the law- is reflected in popular Chinese perceptions of foreigners in 
China. When a Polish exchange student was determined to be the one responsible for having 
kicked a female Chinese pedestrian to the ground in December of 2015, he was given three days 
administrative detention. This light treatment (considering he was suspected of having been 
guilty in a number of similar incidents) caused indignation amongst Chinese, many of whom 
expressed the opinion shared by one netizen who wrote: “Laowai who commit crimes in China 
should face more severe punishment” (Liu, “Polish Exchange Student).21 Police themselves are 
aware of the discontent their preferable treatment to foreigners causes, occasionally taking 
efforts to show the public that they do in fact punish foreign law-breakers, as in the fall of 2015 
when police in Shanghai undertook a citywide campaign to punish subway fare evaders. A police 
representative was quoted in an official news source as saying “We don't discriminate which 
country a violator comes from” (Liu, “Foreigners busted in citywide crackdown”),22 actively 
fighting the perception that foreigers are afforded treatment, and yet in doing so, acknowledging 
that such a sentiment exists. This sense of favorable treatment applies not just to leniency for 
crimes committed, but also to police assistance when foreigners are the victims of crimes. An 
image went viral on Chinese social media in October of 2013 that seemingly showed two real 
advertisements posted in Hefei stating in Chinese: “Foreigner will report crimes for you” 
(Wertime).23 The service (priced at 200 RMB per month) would supposedly help “retrieve lost 
items” as “police take [the complaints of foreigners] seriously” (Wertime). The implication of 
course being that the police are more helpful when foreigners are the ones reporting a crime, 
showing that they receive special treatment. While the authenticity of the image is uncertain, the 
                                                          
21 Liu’s translation 
22 Liu’s translation 
23 Wertime’s translation. In the original Chinese: “laowai dai bao an 老外代报案.” 
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fact that it resonated with so many people shows that there are many Chinese who believe that it 
reflects reality.  
While the law says that foreigners should be treated as Chinese citizens are treated, the 
decisions of policemen who act as “street-level bureaucrats” 24 create a situation where 
interactions between individuals and police do not always match the laws and guidelines 
provided to police from lawmakers above. Whether it is because they pity foreigners, admire 
them, or perhaps most likely, simply want to avoid the hassle of dealing with someone who 
doesn’t speak their language, police choose to treat foreigners with leniency. The central 
government is almost certainly aware of this, and yet like issues of Hong Kong’s self-governance 
it is content to allow the de facto reality to be looser than what is on the books, since this degree 
of freedom does little to challenge the state’s stability. If foreigners are treated less strictly than 
the law prescribes, that leniency can always be spun positively to make China look good.  
I argue that this mirrors Tok’s concept of graded sovereignty as seen in the Mainland’s 
relationship with Taiwan and Hong Kong, where issues that do not challenge the state’s authority 
are treated with considerable leniency, while perceived challenges to Beijing’s de jure 
sovereignty are met with a stern response. This is seen in police treatment of foreigners- general 
lawbreaking by foreigners is more tolerated than when Chinese are the ones breaking the law, 
except in instances where a foreigner’s crime would do damage to the public’s faith in the 
government if left unpunished. An example of this was seen in the summer of 2012: over a 100-
day period starting May 15, police in Beijing began a campaign of rooting out foreigners who 
lacked proper documents, asking for public help in identifying such individuals (Xinhua). The 
                                                          
24 For more information on this concept, see: Lipsky, Michael. Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the 
Individual in Public Services. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1980. 
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news reports announcing the campaign explained it by claiming that illegal foreigners are more 
likely to commit crimes, and framed the action as potentially a response to an incident where a 
British man (who was in the country legally) assaulted a Chinese woman. The footage of this 
incident, combined with the lenient treatment shown to the offender (he was charged with 
molestation instead of rape) incurred outrage amongst Chinese citizens (Shaw). I argue that the 
subsequent campaign was a response to this outrage, initiated by top officials who sensed that a 
lack of action would have a negative effect on the public’s perception of the government. In a 
sense then, this case was one that officials determined could no longer be treated peripherally, 
due to the threat that it posed to the center’s authority.  
Akmal Shaikh’s case similarly required a strong government response because his crime 
(along with the British reaction to his conviction) presented a direct challenge to China’s 
sovereign rule and international status. This is not to say without a doubt that he would have 
received a lighter sentence or been granted a mental health exam were he not British, or had the 
British government not interfered with his case. China takes drug smuggling very seriously- 
hundreds of people are likely executed annually for drug crimes, with nearly ten percent of all 
executions in China in 2014 being for drug crimes (Kaufman). Given this hardline stance against 
drugs, it is entirely possible that Shaikh could still have received the death penalty had the 
British government not interfered. But because that interference came before Shaikh’s appeals, 
and because it transformed the whole issue from that of a foreign lawbreaker to one of 
international debate, it has to be considered as a significant factor leading to Shaikh’s sentence. 
The reason we can suggest political purposes behind Shaikh’s execution is the lack of rule of law 
along with the lack of a clear precedent or consistent pattern. In other cases involving foreigners 
caught trafficking drugs, capital punishment has not always been employed (Zhang). There is 
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also precedent for foreigners responsible for serious crimes being shown leniency due to 
undisputed mental illness (Cohen). Clearly his case had top officials involved as it was taken to 
the Supreme People’s Court, and the strong media defense of his execution can be understood to 
reflect the central leadership’s approval not just of his execution, but also of the denial of 
Shaikh’s lawyers’ request for his mental health to be examined. So why was zero leniency shown 
to him, when capital punishment was not an unavoidable outcome according to law? I propose 
that it was due to his unique symbolic significance as well as a result of the British government’s 
demands that China adjust their behavior. The unique combination of these factors in Shaikh’s 
case set him apart from other foreigners who have committed similarly serious crimes in China 
and yet not received the death penalty. It moved him from the periphery to the core, so to speak, 
confirming that otherwise peripheral issues that present a challenge to Beijing’s ultimate 
sovereignty are dealt with sternly. 
In society, European foreigners remain a symbol of elite status- a high number of models 
in magazines and advertisements are white (Wang, Brand Management, 160)- and Chinese will 
frequently ask to take pictures of and with foreign travelers. In this way, they represent the 
continued prominence of Western countries in the international system. As mentioned above, 
foreigners are also afforded better treatment by Chinese police, which has contributed to the 
notion that they remain a “kind of person that has a special status in China” (Liu, “Foreigners 
Busted”).  How better to show China’s growth in status than by asserting complete control over 
one of these individuals, using him as proof that the government is still strong enough to defend 
the country from negative foreign influence ? By executing Shaikh, the government could show 
that its power extends over even foreigners, unlike the weak Nationalist and imperial 
governments before it. The power to exert complete violence over a person, killing him and 
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depriving him of life, is a core component of sovereignty claims (Friedman, 15). And while 
Shaikh’s case was one of the more extreme displays of sovereignty by China over foreign 
individuals in the past decade, he is by no means unique in being used as a symbolic tool by the 
government to show its strength. More recently, in January of 2016, Peter Dahlin, a 35 year-old 
Swedish man who had directed an NGO in Beijing offering legal aid to Chinese citizens, was 
made to confess his “crimes” (purportedly helping clients who were seeking to destabilize the 
regime) on a video that was then broadcast by China Central Television (Wong). He confessed to 
having “violated Chinese law,” “caused harm to the Chinese government” as well as having 
“hurt the feelings of the Chinese people” (Wong). Other foreigners, such as Peter Humphrey and 
Charles Xue, have also had televised confessions broadcast nationally in recent years. The 
purpose of these videos is “”to demonstrate the party-state’s authority over individuals, pure and 
simple”” (Wong).25 The fact that the individuals confessing are foreigners makes the 
demonstration all the more significant. The message conveyed is that foreigners can be here if 
they submit to the government’s authority- if they fail to do so, they will be punished. 
So how do these demonstrations relate to China’s unique graded sovereignty? I support 
Tok’s position that the flexibility provided by graded rings of sovereignty allows the Mainland 
government to maintain status while also compromising on issues that it cannot afford to take a 
hard stance on, either for practical reasons or for diplomatic reasons. Consider Taiwan: to 
demand Taiwan fully submit to de facto Mainland rule would almost certainly result in war that 
would not only cost huge amounts of money, resources, and life, but would also disrupt the 
economy of the entire region. Such an action would also eliminate any ambiguity in Sino-
American relations and put China firmly opposed to the U.S. and the other leaders of the current 
                                                          
25 Quoting Joshua Rosenzweig, lecturer at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
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system. The PRC has the difficult job of making sure that as it grows in power and gains status, 
it does so in a way that doesn’t worry Western nations too much, lest they collectively work to 
contain China and stifle its growth (Deng, 15-16). But simply granting Taiwan de jure 
sovereignty is not a feasible option either, as recognizing the equal legitimacy of the ROC would 
do major damage to the CPC’s legitimacy. By changing the label from a renegade state to an 
independent Chinese country with a legitimate democratic political system that offers a stark 
contrast to the limited freedoms provided to Mainland citizens, the government would give its 
massive population serious reason to question its rule. And so the Mainland continues to 
maintain a unique relationship with the ROC that can seem to outsiders as unsustainable due to 
its ambiguous nature. Friedman says that it is in fact this ambiguity regarding Taiwan’s status 
that keeps cross-Strait tensions in check (Friedman, 30). Similarly for Hong Kong, a negation of 
the city’s right to govern itself would not only risk damaging the lucrative economy, but would 
also enrage the local populace and other countries such as Britain, neither of which are outcomes 
favorable to the CPC. Upset people start protests which threaten the stability of the regime, and 
too much condemnation from Western countries would turn them against China’s rise, leading 
not only to trade problems but also to a less favorable opinion of China and therefore a lowered 
international status. Graded rings of sovereignty allow China to avoid the undesirable outcomes 
of demanding full obedience from the periphery while maintaining the status that comes from 
claiming the actual sovereignty over a place. The government acts (or reacts) strongly when it 
feels its de jure sovereignty is being challenged, or, when the people feel that the government is 
being weak. Such challenges or lack of faith create the possibility of the stability of the regime 
being threatened, and thus the costs of stern action are in such cases outweighed by the potential 
cost of inaction. These aspects of China’s sovereignty are confirmed upon observation of Akmal 
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Shaikh’s case, especially when placed in the broader picture of how European foreigners are 
treated by the police in China. 
Shaikh, along with Dahlin and other foreigners whose wrongdoings are displayed by the 
government for the world to see, must be understood not only as individuals caught in the legal 
trappings of an authoritarian regime, but also as the objects of a “memory project” being carried 
out by the government. Memory projects are efforts to “create and maintain a kind of collective 
memory that a group of individuals may share, but may not be shared by other groups” (Liao, 
144). As such, they are extremely productive for nation-building, as to be part of a nation is to 
share a “collective memory of the past that binds a group of people together” (Wang, Never 
Forget National Humiliation, 7). Some of the tools of memory projects are quite familiar: 
textbooks expounding a particular version of history, national memorials commemorating the 
heroic members of a country, national anthems sung by young and old, etc. Whether read, 
viewed, or experienced, these tools imbue in the participant a sense, shared with others of their 
nationality, that history and reality should be understood in a certain way, a way which happens 
to be manipulated by those behind the memory project. The Chinese government has taken great 
efforts towards instilling a shared historical memory in its citizens, with education being the 
most visible tool. In his book Governing Educational Desire, Andrew Kipnis writes: “the central 
Chinese government has self-consciously viewed the curriculum more and more as a tool to 
build a unified, patriotic, and Party-loving national culture” (Kipnis, 93). Across the nation, 
children are provided with standardized education regarding China’s past- their past, 
remembered as the CPC wants them to remember it- which homogenizes the public’s historical 
memory. This is accomplished not just through history classes, but also through “patriotic 
themes” that are “force-fed to children in literature, history, social science, and thought and 
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morality classes” (Kipnis, 94). Hating imperialism and being able to identify and denounce it not 
just in historical events but also in confrontational acts by foreign countries (such as the British 
government’s demands that Shaikh not be executed) becomes a virtue taught to children at a 
young age. Consider the PRC’s national anthem, “March of the Volunteers,” which is sung by 
schoolchildren across the nation on a daily basis. The first line is a call to all Chinese, people 
“who refuse to be slaves” (Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, 89). The song ends by 
rallying the nation to “Brave the enemy’s gunfire” and “March on! March on!” The implication 
of these lyrics is clear: there is an enemy that wants to make the Chinese people slaves. The 
antagonism of this vague Other necessitates action- to “march on” together as one nation, united 
by their experiences of being oppressed and of fighting that oppression. This education is useful 
in the government’s memory project because it affects the people of an entire nation from as 
early as they can read and write. It is giving future generations of Chinese a government-
designed way to see not only their country’s history but also a way to see themselves: as 
members of a nation that has overcome hardship and must continue to “march on” in order to 
defeat the enemy and prevent a repeat of the century of humiliation. 
Another way that the government creates this shared historical memory is through the 
strategic framing of past events. A perfect example of this is the Old Summer Palace in Beijing, 
which was destroyed by joint British and French troops in the Second Opium War of 1860 as 
retaliation for the torture and execution of their messengers by the Chinese. Rather than restore 
the site to its former glory as some Chinese have proposed, the government has chosen to leave 
the ruins as they are lest they “distort the history of the destructive Western allied forces” (China 
Daily). Ye Yanfang, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, called the ruins 
“the most concrete evidence of Western atrocities” and as such, they “should be reserved as the 
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scene of a crime” (China Daily). To ensure that this dramatic example of Western aggression 
from a century and a half ago is not forgotten by future generations of Chinese, school trips and 
“government-sponsored “patriotic education” programme[s]” bring countless visitors to the site 
each year (Bowlby). 
Like the ruins of the Old Summer Palace, Shaikh, as well as Dahlin, Xue, and Humphrey, 
were displayed by the government as symbolic objects to confirm their narrative that foreigners 
are still a threat to the Chinese people, and as such became tools of the CPC’s memory project. 
Furthermore, the punishment enacted upon them shows that the CPC is capable of dealing with 
this threat. By holding these guilty foreigners up for criticism and punishment, a sense of 
righteousness is produced by contrast in the eyes of the viewers- they are the ones being 
collectively wronged, and the government is protecting them (Liao, 154). As this dichotomy- 
them versus us, including our government- is repeatedly displayed for the Chinese public, it 
becomes more natural to interpret future actions by foreigners or foreign governments deemed 
wrong by the CPC as indeed wrong. And for a regime concerned about maintaining legitimacy in 
the eyes of its people, any fuel for strengthening that government-people bond is extremely 
valuable. In the case of Shaikh, the Chinese government further supported their claim to 
rightness by portraying British citizens as being equally disgusted with their own government’s 
actions. Global Times, a daily tabloid under the auspices of the government’s People’s Daily, put 
out an article the day after Shaikh’s execution that proudly declared: “British netizens support 
China’s ruling”26 (Huanqiu). The article featured translated comments from British news 
message boards that said in effect “this is China’s responsibility,” portraying the British 
government as out-of-touch with its own people, who could see the hypocrisy of its actions just 
                                                          
26 In the original Chinese: “Ying wangyou zhichi Zhongguo panjue 英网友支持中国判决.” 
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as the Chinese public could. The debate surrounding Shaikh fit perfectly within the government’s 
greater memory project of casting foreigners as historically and continuously opposed to the 
Chinese nation, a nation that becomes more solidified the more a dangerous “other” is clearly 
defined. And through his execution, the government was able to convey to its domestic and 
international audiences that it is indeed sovereign over all people within its borders. As Tim Liao 
writes, “collective memory projects work especially well in “educating” their own citizens about 
their legitimate sovereignty claims based on the set of collective memories built upon a range of 
verifiable historical events” (Liao, 158). 
Shaikh’s symbolic potential as a memory project that made him a useful figure for the 
government was only heightened by the British government’s demands for leniency. The most 
offensive aspect of the whole situation was not simply that a British citizen had tried to smuggle 
drugs into the country- had the British government accepted Shaikh’s fate and respected the 
Chinese courts’ decision to execute him, his case would certainly not have become the major 
issue that it did. What enraged the Chinese public and government alike was that top British 
officials were using rhetoric and political pressure to try and compel their Chinese counterparts 
to grant Shaikh leniency. Throughout the months leading up to Shaikh’s eventual execution in 
December of 2009, top officials within the British government repeatedly expressed their strong 
condemnation of the court ruling, specifically the decision to not review Shaikh’s mental health. 
Foreign Office minister Ivan Lewis personally asked the Chinese ambassador in London, Fu 
Ying, to try and change the outcome (Topping, Watt, and Watts), and the British prime minister 
Gordon Brown even appealed personally to then-Premier Wen Jiabao on the issue (Prince). 
Following Shaikh’s execution, Brown spoke out publically against the ruling, saying that he was 
“appalled and disappointed” at the outcome and that he condemned it “in the strongest terms” 
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(Prince). Overall, the British government made 27 appeals for clemency to the Chinese embassy, 
and yet this strong show of diplomatic pressure was unable to influence the Chinese decision. If 
anything, these actions only served to further seal Shaikh’s fate. It was the demanding response 
of the British government that the Chinese public and government found most offensive and that 
most strongly triggered negative memories of the “century of humiliation.” Once Britain started 
protesting Shaikh’s death sentence, it was easy for the Chinese government to frame the issue as 
one of national sovereignty, where China’s rights to govern itself were being impinged upon. 
This sentiment was echoed across the country’s online message boards: netizen responses 
include: “China is not the China of a hundred years ago”27 and “Almost 200 years later the 
British government once again is playing the same role!”28 (Chinasmack.com). 
These demands would have been viewed by the Chinese public through the lens of 
historical memory of extrality. The government would have been aware of this, and aware of the 
opportunity that Shaikh’s case presented them to show the entire country and the world how far 
China has come. The message afforded by Shaikh’s execution was powerful: no longer can 
China’s laws be dismissed by other nations who find them disagreeable. No longer can 
foreigners demand preferential treatment and expect to receive it. As a case that was being 
managed and defended by top officials, this case can be read as a performative act that reveals 
how Chinese leaders perceive of and strategically engineer their own sovereignty. Significantly, 
that sovereignty extends over foreign nationals who commit crimes within China’s borders, 
something that was long denied China. While extrality has not existed in China for 70 years, the 
                                                          
27 In the original Chinese: “Zhongguo yi bu shi bai nian qian de Zhongguo le 中国已不是百年前的中国了.” 
28 In the original Chinese: “jiang jin 200 nian hou Yingguo go-vern-ment you yi ci banyan le tongyang de jiao 将近
200年后英国 go-vern-ment又一次扮演了同样的角!” 
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right to try and execute foreigners (specifically Britons) by Chinese law had never been 
exercised before Shaikh.  
This case also shows the balance that China’s leaders have to manage between 
maintaining productive relations with other countries and cementing their legitimacy in the eyes 
of the public. By acquiescing to British requests for Shaikh’s mental health to be considered, 
China’s leaders could have done their relationship with one of the most influential countries in 
the world a favor and demonstrated their sensitivity to human rights, elevating its international 
status to a degree. But such potential benefits were outweighed by the potential cost- giving in to 
British demands to manage the case a certain way would have looked too much like the weak 
submission to Western powers that the CPC has spent nearly a century condemning. By putting 
China’s face in the eyes of its people on the line, British diplomats effectively eliminated any 
chance that Shaikh had for a lighter sentence. In this instance, China’s leaders prioritized their 
domestic spectators over the angry British officials who failed to appreciate the historical gravity 
of the situation. For much of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, the men in 
power in China made the opposite choice in trying to appease the stronger nations who denied 
them the right to possess full authority in their own country. The CPC realized very early on that 
one of its greatest strengths is the ability to deny such a past- it has successfully labeled itself the 
party of liberation from foreign imperialism, and Akmal Shaikh provided them with a golden 
opportunity to prove that it deserves that label. His execution was interpreted in China not as the 
tragic violation of a mentally ill person’s human rights, but rather as a strong and admirable 
response to the arrogant attempts of the British to treat China like it used to during the “century 
of humiliation.” For any in China who sympathized with Shaikh or disagreed with ruling, his 
execution serves to convey another message: that the Party is indeed an enemy to be feared, and 
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one that takes any potential threats to its rule and honor very seriously. It might also be 
considered noteworthy that Shaikh, a Muslim, was executed in the capital of the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region not half a year after the same city was racked by Uighur riots that 
resulted in hundreds dead or injured. At the time of his death in December of 2009, Urumqi was 
still filled with police tasked with keeping the peace (Sainsbury). While Shaikh himself was not 
associated with any kind of separatist movement, nor did the government deny him a proper 
Muslim burial, his execution nonetheless must have been a somber reminder of the complete 
control that the government maintains over the lives of individuals. This duel message- we will 
protect our country from external harm, and we have the power to do so- resonates with the 
image of the government Tahirih Lee found being conveyed by media articles going all the way 
back to the 1950s: caring and protective, yet strict and harsh when disobeyed” (Lee, 480). 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 As China continues to grow in power and status, its history nonetheless remains an 
important element influencing both how international issues are perceived and how the 
government portrays itself. This history is a memory project designed by CPC leadership to 
reaffirm their capability in defending the nation from foreign threats to China’s sovereignty. In 
this work I have presented a look at how the historical memory of extrality shapes contemporary 
Chinese interpretations of sovereignty and their place in the international system, as seen in the 
case of Akmal Shaikh. When the British government argued that Shaikh should not be executed, 
the issue of his crime and how it would be punished became a question of the Chinese 
government’s ability to resist the imposition of foreign will. As such, executing Shaikh was as 
much a performative display of the CPC’s strength in the face of international pressure as it was 
a punishment of his crime. This performance of sovereignty was framed by the Chinese media to 
contrast with the weakness of the Qing and Republican regimes in resisting foreign violations of 
Chinese sovereignty. By doing so, China’s leaders bolster their own legitimacy claims by 
proving themselves capable of protecting the country from a historical enemy that they portray as 
being as much of a threat to China’s sovereignty today as in the days of extrality. 
 This desire to cement their legitimacy as the leaders of China motivates the CPC to 
respond sternly to any challenges to its authority. Tok shows how the central government 
prioritizes maintaining de jure sovereignty over de facto control in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and I 
argue that this attitude is reflected not just in territorial claims but also in the government’s 
treatment of foreign criminals. While the movements and illegal activities of foreigners were 
closely monitored during the first decade following Deng’s reforms, the current situation sees 
 - 55 - 
 
Chinese police treating foreigners who break the law more leniently than they do Chinese, 
showing that domestic lawbreaking is a more central concern to the government. Like the greater 
autonomy allowed to Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan, this lenient treatment of foreigners can 
be interpreted as evidence that the central government sees them existing on the periphery, where 
de facto control can be relaxed as long as de jure sovereignty is not challenge. When a 
foreigner’s crime (or their home country’s response to their conviction) presents a challenge to 
Beijing’s de jure authority, the issue moves from the periphery to the center, and must then be 
dealt with in a firm manner. 
I argue that this is exactly what happened in the case of Akmal Shaikh. The British 
government’s confrontational response to his sentence was interpreted as an attempt to violate 
China’s sovereignty, and thus presented a challenge to China’s de jure authority over foreigners 
within its borders. This development prevented the possibility of Shaikh receiving a lighter 
sentence in a court of appeals, as central leadership could no longer afford to show him leniency. 
This work should not be read as a prediction of future action on the part of the Chinese 
government, nor can the conclusion be drawn that the central government’s concern for its own 
status and legitimacy is the sole factor to consider in interpreting state action. It is, however, an 
important factor, and by examining how this concern is enmeshed with issues of historical 
memory and sovereignty, we can build a better understanding of contemporary China.  
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